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This paper examines the theoretical and empirical evidence for the hypothesis that 
manufacturing is the main engine of growth in developing countries. The paper opens 
with an overview of the main arguments supporting the engine of growth hypothesis 
and then examines each of these arguments using a mix of statistical analysis of 
secondary data and secondary literature. The paper concludes that manufacturing will 
continue to be important in accelerating growth and achieving catch-up in developing 
countries. However, compared to the past 60 years, market service sectors will become 
relatively more important as potential sources of growth and catch up.  
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Since the industrial revolution in the eighteenth century manufacturing has been considered 
to be the main engine of economic growth and development. In development theory structural 
change was associated specifically with a shift of resources from the primary sector to the 
manufacturing sector. In recent years, however, the role of the manufacturing sector has been 
increasingly questioned. First, it is clear that the advanced economies are now predominantly 
service economies. Second, economic historians increasingly recognize the importance of 
service sectors such as trade, transport, and financial intermediation which have contributed 
to industrialization and development. Finally, the recent experiences of India and other 
emerging economies raise the question whether services have become the key sector in 
economic development in the twenty-first century.  
This paper contributes to this debate by examining some of the theoretical and empirical 
evidence for the proposition that manufacturing has acted as the main engine of growth in 
developing countries in the period 1950–2005. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the main eight arguments for the hypothesis that 
manufacturing is the main engine of growth. In Section 3.1–3.8 these arguments are 
examined one by one on the basis of secondary literature and available secondary statistics. 
Section 4 concludes. 
Before proceeding, however, we need to enter an important caveat. Even if we were to 
conclude that manufacturing has indeed been one of the most important engines of growth, 
this does not mean that other sectors of the economy such as agriculture or services should be 
neglected. One of the classic failures of post-war industrial policy has been the favouring of 
manufacturing and the discrimination against the agricultural sector in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia. This has tended to retard agricultural development and indirectly has harmed 
industrial development and the overall rate of growth through the intersectoral linkages 
between agriculture and manufacturing (Szirmai 2005). Similar intersectoral linkages exist 
between manufacturing and services. From a policy perspective one should always keep the 
balance and the linkages between sectors in mind. 
2  The case for manufacturing  
There are powerful empirical and theoretical arguments in favour of industrialization as the 
main engine of growth in economic development. The arguments can be summarized as 
follows: 
1.  There is an empirical correlation between the degree of industrialization and the 
levels of per capita income in developing countries. More industrialized developing 
countries tend to be richer than less industrialized developing countries. 
2.  Productivity is higher in the manufacturing sector than in the agricultural sector. The 
transfer of resources from agriculture to manufacturing provides a structural change 
bonus. A dynamic version of the structural change bonus argument is that 
manufacturing has higher rates of productivity growth than other sectors. 6 
 
3.  The transfer of resources from manufacturing to services provides a structural change 
burden in the form of Baumol’s disease. As the share of the service sector increases, 
aggregate per capita growth will tend to slow down. 
4.  Compared to agriculture, the manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for 
capital accumulation. Capital accumulation can be more easily realized in spatially 
concentrated manufacturing than in spatially dispersed agriculture. This is one of the 
reasons why the emergence of manufacturing has been so important in growth and 
development. Capital-intensity is high in manufacturing (and also in other industrial 
sub-sectors such as mining, utilities and construction. It is much lower in agriculture 
and services. Capital accumulation is one of the aggregate sources of growth. Thus, an 
increasing share of manufacturing and industry will contribute to aggregate growth.  
5.  The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for economies of scale, which 
are less available in agriculture or services.  
6.  The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for both embodied and 
disembodied technological progress (Cornwall 1977). Technological advance is 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector and diffuses from there to other economic 
sectors such as the service sector. 
7.  Linkage and spillover effects are stronger in manufacturing than in agriculture or 
mining. Linkage effects refer to the direct backward and forward linkages between 
different sectors, they create positive externalities to investments in given sectors. 
Spillover effects refer to the disembodied knowledge flows between sectors. Spillover 
effects are a special case of externalities which refer to externalities of investment in 
knowledge and technology. Linkage and spillover effects are presumed to be stronger 
within manufacturing than within other sectors. Linkage and spillover effects between 
manufacturing and other sectors such as services or agriculture are also very 
powerful. 
8.  As per capita incomes rises, the share of agricultural expenditures in total 
expenditures declines and the share of expenditures on manufactured goods increases 
(Engel’s law). Countries specializing in agricultural and primary production will not 
profit from expanding world markets for manufacturing goods. 
The arguments mentioned under points 4, 5, 6, and 7 refer to specific characteristics which 
supposedly make the manufacturing sector more productive and more dynamic than other 
sectors. Arguments 2 and 3 about the structural change bonus and burden depend on the 
assumption of higher productivity levels and growth rates in manufacturing. Point 7 points to 
the positive externalities which transmit growth from manufacturing to other sectors. Point 8 
brings in the role of demand and suggests that the demand elasticities interact with supply 
effects to produce more rapid economic development. The first point is an empirical 
proposition about the relationship between industrialization and the level of development. 
Logically it follows from the arguments discussed under points 8. 
3  Examination of the arguments for the engine of growth hypothesis 
In this section, we provide a further elaboration of the debate on the role of manufacturing. 
We also examine some of the empirical evidence for the different propositions, using a mix 
of secondary data and secondary literature. 7 
 
3.1  Empirical correlations between industrialization and economic development 
The historical evidence points to the overall correlation between industrialization and the 
level of economic development. The presently advanced economies are the countries that first 
embarked on industrialization when the developing countries were still oriented towards 
primary production. Also, the more successful developing countries are invariably those that 
have been able to industrialize. The historical record provides strong support for this 
correlation. 
Statistically the correlation is less easy to demonstrate, because the advanced economies have 
become service economies where service sectors account for over two thirds of GDP. This 
makes the relationship between industrialization and per capita income a curvilinear one with 
a positive relationship between the share of manufacturing and GDP per capita at lower levels 
of per capita GDP and a negative relationship at higher levels (Rodrik 2009). The sequence of 
structural change in developing economies is different from the earlier patterns of structural 
change in the presently advanced economies. In the earlier pattern of structural change, the 
shares of manufacturing in GDP and employment increased first, the shares of services 
increased later. In developing countries the share of services in GDP was usually already 
larger than that of the industrial sector in the 1950s and 1960s (Szirmai 2005). 
Contributions of manufacturing to growth can be measured in different ways: using growth 
accounting techniques and econometric analysis (Bosworth, Collins and Chen 1995; 
Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999, 2002, 2007; Timmer and de Vries 2009). Growth accounting 
techniques analyse what proportion of a given growth rate of national income derives from 
growth of manufacturing. These techniques are straightforward and transparent. But they do 
tend to underestimate the contributions of dynamic sectors because they do not take various 
external effects and spillovers into account (argument 7). The role of manufacturing in 
nurturing technological advance and enhancing spillovers may make the net contribution of 
manufacturing to aggregate growth greater than found measuring direct sectoral contributions 
to growth. Such spillover effects are better captured with econometric techniques. 
The evidence in the secondary literature is mixed. The older literature tends to emphasize the 
importance of manufacturing, the more recent literature finds that the contribution of service 
sector has increased. Also, in the more recent literature one finds that manufacturing tends to 
be more important as an engine of growth in developing countries than in advanced 
economies and also more important in the period 1950–73 than in the period after 1973.  
Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) regress real GDP growth rates on growth rates of 
manufacturing. If the coefficient of manufacturing growth is higher than the share of 
manufacturing in GDP, this is interpreted as supporting the engine of growth hypothesis. 
Fagerberg and Verspagen find that manufacturing was typically an engine of growth in 
developing countries in East Asia and Latin America, but that there was no significant effect 
of manufacturing in the advanced economies. In a second paper by the same authors 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002), they examine the impact of shares of manufacturing and 
services on growth in three periods: 1966–72, 1973–83, and 1984–95 and for a sample of 76 
countries. They find that manufacturing has much more positive contributions to growth 
before 1973 than after this year. The interpretation in both papers is that the period 1950–73 8 
 
offered special opportunities for catch-up through the absorption of mass production 
manufacturing techniques from the USA. After 1973, information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) started to become more important as a source of productivity growth, 
especially in the 1990s. These technologies are no longer within the exclusive domain of 
manufacturing, but also operate in the service sector. 
An article by Timmer and de Vries (2009) also confirms the increasing importance of the 
service sector. Using growth accounting techniques, they examine the contributions of 
different sectors in periods of growth accelerations, in periods of normal growth and in 
periods of deceleration. In periods of normal growth they find that manufacturing contributes 
most to growth. In periods of acceleration, this leading role is taken over by the service 
sector, though manufacturing continues to have an important positive contribution.  
For India, Chakravarty and Mitra (2008) conclude on the basis of vector autoregression 
analysis that manufacturing is still one of the important drivers of growth, though more and 
more activities are becoming independent of the manufacturing sector. Kathuria and Raj 
(2009) focus on regional differences in growth in India. They analyse the relationship 
between manufacturing growth and output growth in Indian states (including the informal 
sector) and find support for the engine of growth hypothesis and conclude that manufacturing 
is still functioning as an engine of growth, even in India with its important and dynamic ICT 
service sectors. 
Rodrik (2009) finds that rapid growth in developing countries since 1960 is strongly 
associated with structural change—the transfer of resources from traditional sectors to more 
modern industrial sectors. He explicitly concludes that transition to modern industrial 
activities acts as an engine of growth. But he is rather vague about what he means by 
‘modern’ activities. They also include non-traditional primary activities such as horticulture 
in Ethiopia.  
Recent research by Szirmai and Verspagen (2010) finds significant relationships between the 
shares of manufacturing in GDP at the beginning of five-year periods and average growth 
rates in five-year periods for a panel dataset of 90 countries for the period 1950–2005. 
However, when the sample is split into different sub-periods or different groups of countries 
the relationship is much less straightforward. 
In Table 1, we try to capture the empirical relationship between industrialization and 
development by focusing on the share of manufacturing in total commodity production (i.e. 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) rather than in total GDP (see 
for a similar approach Balance, Ansari, and Singer 1982). The share of manufacturing in 
commodity value added is set out against a country’s per capita gross national income in 
2000. We find a highly significant positive correlation of 0.74 between a country’s rank in 
terms of the logarithm of income per capita and its rank in terms of share of manufacturing in 
commodity production. Services are excluded from this table. Thus it cannot tell us whether 
manufacturing-led growth is more important than service-led growth. What we do learn is 
that the structure of commodity production is related to levels of per capita income and that 
manufacturing matters in this context. 9 
 
In line with the argument in the previous section about different patterns of structural change 
and different initial conditions, the correlation is not a perfect one. Major exceptions among 
the advanced economies are primary exporters such as Norway, Canada, and Australia. 
Among the developing countries, Taiwan, Thailand, and Brazil rank higher in terms of 
industrialization than in terms of income. Nevertheless, the table illustrates the general point 
about industrialization. The poorest countries in the table are invariably those with the lowest 
shares of manufacturing and the highest shares of agriculture in commodity production. The 
more prosperous countries are the more industrialized ones. 
3.2  Structural change bonus 
A second argument in favour of industrialization states that labour productivity in agriculture 
is much lower than labour productivity in industry. A transfer of labour from low 
productivity agriculture to high productivity industry results in an immediate increase in 
overall productivity and income per capita. This transfer has been a major source of growth in 
developing countries. It is referred to as the structural change bonus (Chenery, Robinson, and 
Syrquin 1986; Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999; Fei and Ranis 1964; Lewis 1954; Rodrik 
2009; Temple and Woessman 2006; Timmer and Szirmai 2000; Timmer and de Vries 2009; 
van Ark and Timmer 2003).  
Table 2 presents data on value added per worker for a selected number of developing 
countries for which data are available for longer periods. It is immediately clear from this 
table that value added per worker is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture. This is 
in line with the structural bonus argument. There will be a positive static shift effect, when 
workers relocate to manufacturing. 
It is also not surprising that labour productivity in the capital-intensive mining sector is far 
higher than that in manufacturing. The results with regard to services in Latin America are 
more puzzling. Between 1950 and 1970, labour productivity in the service sector in Latin 
American countries is much higher than in manufacturing. If this is not due to measurement 
error, this would suggest that transfer of resources to services would provide a higher static 
shift effect than to manufacturing, which is counter-intuitive. From 1980 onwards, however, 
productivity in manufacturing is substantially higher than in services, which is more in line 
with our expectations.1 
A second aspect of the structural change bonus argument focuses on the dynamics of sectors. 
If productivity growth in manufacturing is more rapid than in other sectors, a transfer of 
resources to this sector will result in more rapid aggregate growth (this is referred to as the 
dynamic shift effect). Here the evidence is more mixed. In the world’s richest countries 
growth of labour productivity in agriculture in the post-war period has been higher than in 
industry—particularly due to bio-technological innovation (see Maddison 1991). However, in 
                                                 
1   The use of constant prices with a base year in the 1990s of course overestimates the share of services in 
value added relative value added in the early years, as manufacturing prices increase less than service prices. 
But a similar table with current values—not reproduced here—shows very similar patterns. 10 
 
most developing countries productivity growth in manufacturing has been more rapid than in 
the agricultural sector between 1950 and 1973.  
In Table 3, we present a comparison of growth rates in manufacturing and agriculture in a 
sample of developing countries (derived from the GGDC 10-sector database). These are 
compared with sectoral growth rates in advanced economies in the post-war period. This 
table provides some interesting findings which provide a more nuanced picture of the role of 
manufacturing in growth. Between 1950 and 1973, the growth rate of labour productivity in 
manufacturing is substantially higher than in agriculture and also higher than that in the total 
economy. This is even more pronounced if we look at growth of output (8.6 per cent versus 
3.9 per cent). Manufacturing is clearly a very dynamic sector contributing to overall growth 
performance. Between 1950 and 1973, productivity growth in manufacturing is higher than in 
agriculture in ten out of 14 countries. In the case of value added, all countries show higher 
growth in manufacturing in this period. 
After 1973, the picture becomes more complicated. Our sample of developing countries starts 
looking more like the advanced economies in that productivity growth in agriculture is 
systematically higher than in manufacturing. This is true for 12 out of the 16 developing 
countries in Table 3. However, in terms of value added the growth rate in manufacturing is 
still much higher in ten out of 16 developing countries in the table. This is consistent with a 
shrinking share of agriculture in total value added. The same pattern can be seen in the 
sample of advanced economies. In terms of productivity per person engaged, the agricultural 
sector systematically outperforms the manufacturing sector and the total economy. A smaller 
fraction of the total labour force is producing more and more output per person in agriculture. 
The only real exceptions are the European catch up economies, Poland and Ireland, where 
productivity growth in manufacturing is much higher than in agriculture.  
However, in terms of value added, growth in manufacturing and growth in the total economy 
is much more rapid than in agriculture. Agriculture’s share in valued added has 
systematically been shrinking. Summarizing the information in Table 3, we may conclude 
that in developing countries manufacturing is indeed one of the more dynamic sectors in 
terms of productivity and output growth, especially in the period 1950–73. In the period 
1973–2003, productivity growth in agriculture surpasses that of manufacturing, but 
manufacturing still dominates in terms of output growth.  
3.3  Structural change burden 
In many service sectors, the possibilities for productivity growth are limited due to the 
inherently labour-intensive nature of service production. This implies that an increasing share 
of services results in a productivity slowdown (Baumol’s law, Baumol 1967). Such service 
sectors include personal services, restaurants and hotels, health care and medical services, 
and government. What productivity improvement there is, often takes the place of reducing 
quality of output or simply providing less services for the same price, so it should not show 
up in productivity indices if these were correctly measured using hedonic price indices. 
Baumol’s law has recently come under fire, because there are some very important market 
service sectors such as the financial sector, software services, transport and logistics and 11 
 
retail sales and distribution where there are major productivity improvements, often based on 
ICTs (Triplett and Bosworth 2003; de Vries 2010). Nevertheless, the working hypothesis is 
that countries with very large service sectors will tend to grow at a slower rate than countries 
with a smaller service sector. Advanced economies are predominantly service economies and 
these are all characterized by slower aggregate growth rates (Hartwig 2011; Nordhaus 2008). 
This creates new possibilities for catch-up in developing countries where the industrial and 
the manufacturing sector have a proportionately larger share in output. 
On the other hand, developing countries are characterized by a rather large share of the 
service sector at rather early stages of development in the 1950s. They did not follow the 
traditional linear sequence of a shift from agriculture to manufacturing, followed by a shift 
from manufacturing to services. As much of the large service sector in post-war developing 
countries consisted of large, inefficient and extremely unproductive government sectors, 
developing countries suffered from a structural change burden at early stages of development. 
Other parts of the service sector consist of activities of ‘survival entrepreneurs’ in the 
informal sector, which are also not very productive or dynamic. But, in recent years in 
countries such as India, larger parts of the service sector consist of dynamic activities such as 
IT services, which would tend to reduce or even eliminate the structural change burden. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to test these hypotheses using regression analysis, because of 
endogeneity issues. Rich countries have larger service sectors because the demand for 
services increases at higher levels of income. So, even if the service sector acts as a brake on 
growth, service sector shares will not be negatively correlated with per capita income levels.2  
3.4  Opportunities for capital accumulation 
The reasons for high labour productivity and rapid labour productivity growth in 
manufacturing are manifold. Important reasons included capital accumulation, economies of 
scale, and technological progress. Spatially concentrated activities such as manufacturing 
offer better possibilities for capital accumulation and capital-intensification than spatially 
dispersed agriculture. The most capital-intensive sectors in the economy are manufacturing, 
mining, construction, and utilities. 
Internationally comparable data on capital stocks are scarce, especially for developing 
countries. In Table 4, we have put together data for a selected number of developing 
countries from a World Bank database compiled by Larson et al. (2000). We compared these 
with data for advanced economies from the EUKLEMS database. This table provides some 
very interesting results 
                                                 
2  A better approach is to analyse the impact of the sectoral shares at the beginning of a period on growth rates 
of l per capita in that period (cf. Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999). 
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•  In developing countries, capital-intensity in manufacturing is much higher than in 
agriculture (as expected).3 The shift from agriculture to manufacturing is important in 
the process of aggregate capital accumulation. 
•  Between 1970 and 1990, capital-intensity in manufacturing as a percentage of the 
total economy capital-intensity declines. Other sectors become more capital-intensive. 
The importance of manufacturing as the sector driving capital accumulation declines: 
•  In the advanced economies the roles of agriculture and manufacturing have been 
reversed with regard to capital-intensity. Capital-intensity in the small sector of 
agriculture is much higher than in manufacturing. This has to do with the 
‘industrialization of agriculture’. In the advanced economies the share of agricultural 
labour and value added has declined enormously, but agriculture has become much 
more productive due to the application of very capital-intensive technologies such as 
greenhouse farming, intensive pig, cattle, and poultry farming, use of combines, and 
so forth. But there is also a measurement problem. The EUKLEMS data seem to 
include tree stocks and cattle stocks. This overstates the capital-intensiveness of 
agriculture, because tree stocks and cattle stocks do not refer to capital accumulation 
in the modern technological sense. In the case of the developing countries, we have 
been able to exclude tree and cattle stocks. 
•  The advanced economy data illustrate that manufacturing has become one of the less 
capital-intensive sectors of the economy. The EUKLEMS data indicate that mining, 
utilities and transport are the most capital-intensive sectors. Agriculture also has 
above average capital-intensity. Manufacturing has become much less important as a 
key sector where capital accumulation takes place. There are again measurement 
issues. The data in the table refer to total fixed capital formation, including fixed 
structures. It is very likely that in terms of machinery and equipment the data would 
show a more important role for manufacturing.  
In economic growth accounting studies, the contribution of growth of physical capital to 
growth of output in post-war advanced economies turns out to be less important than 
previously thought. Other factors such as growth of employment, growth of human capital, 
and disembodied technological change are very important as well (Maddison 1987; Thirlwall 
1997). However, for developing countries, physical capital accumulation still seems to be of 
great importance because they start with so much less capital per worker (Bosworth, Collins, 
and Chen 1995; Nadiri 1972; Hoffman 1965; Pilat 1994; Thirlwall 1997). 
3.5  Opportunities for scale economies  
Historically the industrial sector (including mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) 
profited in particular from economies of scale, compared to service sectors and agriculture. 
This is partly due to the nature of technologies which are most productively applied in large 
scale production. But it also has to do with learning by doing. Expansion of production 
expands the scope for learning (Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999). Thus, the rate of growth of 
                                                 
3  The same is true for mining and utilities (figures not reproduced here). 13 
 
productivity in manufacturing depends positively on the rate of growth of output (Kaldor 
1966, 1967; Verdoorn 1949).  
With the rise of ICTs this may have changed from the 1990s onwards. In certain service 
sectors, scale effects have become overwhelmingly important, as the marginal costs of 
providing an additional unit of service have come close to zero. The question is justified 
whether the role of manufacturing in future growth may become less important than in the 
past 60 years. The service sector might become the new engine of growth. It is too early to 
say whether this is indeed the case. Many service sectors—such as government, medical 
services, education, and personal care—still suffer from the Baumol’s disease. In the case of 
digitalized services, the marginal costs may be close to zero, but there is an increasing 
problem of appropriation of revenues from these services, as the flow of services becomes 
impossible to control and valorise. 
3.6 Technological  change 
The manufacturing sector offers special opportunities for both embodied and disembodied 
technological progress. Rapid capital accumulation is associated with embodied technological 
progress, as new generations of capital goods embody the latest state-of-the art technology. 
Disembodied technological progress refers to changes in the knowledge of product and 
process technologies in firms and in the economy as a whole. Since the industrial revolution, 
technological advance has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector and diffuses from 
there to other economic sectors such as the service sector. Cornwall (1977) in particular has 
argued that manufacturing is the locus of technological progress. Even in the IT sector, 
advances in software applications are dependent on advances in hardware chip technologies 
and information transmission technologies such as fibre optics and satellite technologies. 
Some brief remarks need to be made here about the difficulties in unscrambling capital 
accumulation and technological change. From the perspective of a developing country, the 
use of more capital goods per worker in itself represents an important kind of technological 
change. The mode of production changes dramatically, and the mastering of new, usually 
imported, technologies requires major innovative efforts on behalf of developing countries 
and their firms. In this sense, all capital accumulation in developing countries represents 
technological change. It involves the diffusion of machinery from the advanced economies 
and diffusion of the technologies embodied in them.  
But, one needs to distinguish between the increase in the pure volume of existing capital 
goods (more of the same) and the shift over time from technologically less sophisticated to 
technologically more advanced capital goods. This is called embodied technological change, 
still a form of international diffusion of technology through capital imports, but now with the 
emphasis on the upgrading of the capital stock. 
Next, in the course of economic development, output per unit of input (total factor 
productivity) can increase due to various factors—shifts from one economic sector to 
another, economies of scale, and more efficient allocation of resources within sectors. One of 
the most important factors, which can cause increases in output per unit of input, is so-called 14 
 
disembodied technological change. Disembodied technological change refers to general 
advances in science, technology, and the state of knowledge; changes in the stocks of 
knowledge available to firms, sectors, or countries; improvements in the level of knowledge 
absorbed by employees and managers in educational institutions and on the job (Maddison 
1987); learning-by-doing by workers and managers on the job; improvements in the 
collective technological capabilities of firms or the social capabilities of countries and finally 
positive external effects of investment in knowledge; and new technologies, through 
spillovers from firm to firm or from country to country. 
3.7  Linkage and spillover effects 
Linkage effects refer to the direct backward and forward linkages between different sectors or 
firms. Linkages are direct physical relations of intersectoral supply and demand. The positive 
external effect of linkages is that they can create economies of scale in the domestic 
economy. Spillover effects refer to the disembodied knowledge and technology flows 
between economic actors and economic sectors. Actors learn from each other, so that 
investment in technological knowledge or increased efficiency in one firm has positive 
external effects on the economy as a whole. 
Intersectoral backward and forward linkages in manufacturing are perceived to be much 
stronger than in mining or agriculture which are typically characterized by weak linkages 
(Cornwall 1977; Hirschman 1958; Myint 1980). Investment in one branch of manufacturing 
can have strong positive external effects on other sectors. 
Spillover effects between manufacturing and other sectors are also very powerful. As 
indicated above, the manufacturing sector is one of the primary sources of technological 
advance in the economy as a whole. It is here that most product and process technologies are 
developed. One of the important spillover effects in modern economies is that from the 
industrial sector to other sectors, such as the service sector. Thus, advances in IC hardware 
technologies produced in the manufacturing sector (silicon chips, glass fibre cables) fuel 
technological change in the software producing and software using service sectors. 
3.8 Engel’s  law 
The argument in the previous paragraph was couched in terms of supply factors. But demand 
relationships and factors are also relevant for the debate about the role of manufacturing. The 
lower the per capita income of a country, the larger the proportion of that income will be 
spent on basic agricultural foodstuffs—this is known as the Engel’s law (Engel 1857). As per 
capita incomes increase, the demand for agricultural products will decline and the demand for 
industrial products will tend to increase. Economic development creates a mass market for 
industrial products. This creates dynamic opportunities for manufacturing. If a country 
remains in agriculture and fails to develop its domestic manufacturing industry, it will have to 
import increasing amounts of manufactured goods. 
However, a similar argument could be made for services at higher levels of per capita of 
income. At higher levels of economic development, the income elasticity of service 
consumption is quite high (Chakravarty and Mitra 2009). This is an argument in favour of 15 
 
service-led growth at higher levels of development. However, one has to distinguish between 
real changes in the composition of demand and price effects. Due to Baumol’s law, 
productivity in services will lag behind that of manufacturing. If service wage levels follow 
manufacturing wage levels, then the price of services will increase, leading to higher 
proportions of income being spent on services. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper has presented an overview of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for the 
proposition that in the past 50 years, manufacturing has functioned as an important engine of 
growth in developing countries. There is no doubt that manufacturing has been an important 
driver of growth and catch-up. But not all expectations of the engine of growth hypotheses 
are supported by the statistical evidence, in particular not with regard to the presumed higher 
capital-intensity in manufacturing and the productivity dynamics of manufacturing. In more 
recent years, productivity growth in agriculture has even been higher than in manufacturing. 
The review of the secondary literature also presents a mixed picture. The older literature 
tends to emphasize the importance of manufacturing, the more recent literature finds that the 
contribution of service sectors has increased. Manufacturing is definitely important, 
especially in the period 1950–73 and much more so in developing countries than in advanced 
economies. It continues to act as a vehicle of catch-up to the present. But in the advanced 
economies the contribution of the service sector has become more and more important and 
the share of services in GDP is now well above 70 per cent.4  
The more general historical evidence provides stronger support for the engine of growth 
thesis. There are no important examples of success in economic development in developing 
countries since 1950 which have not been driven by industrialization. All the Asian catch up 
stories are stories of successful industrialization. Neither tourism, nor primary exports, nor 
services have played a similar role, with the possible exception of IT services in India since 
2000. But even in India manufacturing has been and still is of great importance.  
Sub-Saharan African countries are underrepresented in most statistical exercises and 
statistical databases. With the exception of South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, and Namibia, 
they all have very low per capita incomes, disappointing long-run growth performance and 
they have all failed to industrialize. Their development experiences provide further support 
for the engine of growth hypothesis. 
What can one conclude with regards to the future role of manufacturing in the twenty-first 
century? The answers can at best be somewhat speculative, but let us nevertheless try to 
formulate some expectations.  
                                                 
4  As prices of services have increased far more than those of industrial goods, the share of the service sector in 
constant prices has increased far less and the contribution to growth will also be less than when measured at 
current prices.  16 
 
1.  Given the sheer size of the service sector in the advanced economies, productivity 
advances and technological change in the service sector have inevitably become more 
important in explaining differences in growth performance between the advanced 
economies. Thus in recent years, more rapid productivity growth in key service sectors in 
the USA is one of the factors explaining the productivity gap between the USA and 
Europe (van Ark, O’Mahoney, and Timmer 2008).  
2.  Manufacturing will continue to be important in accelerating growth and achieving catch-
up in developing countries, especially in countries at lower levels of per capita income.  
3.  Compared to the past 60 years, market service sectors will become relatively more 
important as potential sources of growth and catch-up.  
4.  As developing countries become richer and their economic structure becomes more 
similar to that of the presently advanced economies, the importance of manufacturing will 
tend to decline. But as developing countries come closer to the technological frontier, 
their rates of growth will also tend to slow down as a consequence of the structural 
change burden.  
5.  With the exception of small island economies, which are a special case, it is hard to 
imagine sustained growth spurts in less developed countries exclusively driven by the 
primary sector, by the construction sector, or by market services alone.  
6.  One of the most important lessons from past experiences is that industrial policy should 
not over-emphasize the importance of a single sector, however important it seems to be. 
Linkages between agriculture and manufacturing, between services and industry, have 
been important in the past and will continue to be so in future patterns of economic 
development.  
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Table 1: Industrialization and per capita gross national product in 2000 
(45 countries) 
   Share of manufacturing in  GNP per capita (2000 US$) 
   total commodity production (a)   
   (%) (b)  Ranking    Ranking 
Switzerland 72  2  38,140  1 
Japan 64  11  35,620  2 
Norway 26  40  34,530  3 
USA 63 14  34,100  4 
Denmark 60  17  32,280  5 
Sweden 66  9  27,140  6 
Austria 60  16  25,220  7 
Finland 66  8  25,130  8 
Germany 72  3  25,120  9 
Netherlands 58  18  24,970  10 
Belgium 69  4  24,540  11 
UK 60  15  24,430  12 
France 65  10  24,090  13 
Canada 56  20  21,130  14 
Australia 45  25  20,240  15 
Italy 66 7  20,160  16 
Taiwan 77  1  14,188  17 
South Korea  66  6  8,910  18 
Argentina 55  22  7,460  19 
Mexico 63  12  5,070  20 
Chile 36  32  4,590  21 
Venezuela 35  34  4,310  22 
Brazil 67  5  3,580  23 
Malaysia 58  19  3,380 24 
Turkey 36  30  3,100  25 
South Africa  55  21  3,020  26 
Peru 41 26  2,080  27 
Colombia 31  36  2,020  28 
Thailand 63  13  2,000 29 
Egypt 38  29  1,490  30 
Nigeria 38  28  1,180  31 
Philippines 48  24  1,040  32 
Sri Lanka  36  33  850  33 
China 52  23  840  34 20 
 
Côte d’Ivoire  36  31  600  35 
Indonesia 41  27  570  36 
India 31 38  450  37 
Pakistan 31  37  440  38 
Bangladesh 30  39  370  39 
Kenya 34  35  350  40 
Ghana 15  42  340 41 
Zambia 25  41  300  42 
Tanzania 12  43  270  43 
Morocco 5  45  260  44 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  6  44  100  45 
Notes: (a) Value added in manufacturing as percentage of total value in commodity production (agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities).  
(b) Manufacturing share OECD countries, latest year in period 1998–2000. 
Sources: GNP per capita and shares from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002), except: Zaire from 
World Bank, available at: www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html. 
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, and the USA: calculated with OECD Main Economic Indicators 
(2010), available at: www.oecd.org/EN/document/0, EN-document-7-nodirectorate-no-1-5194-7,00.html), and 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (2000), available at: www.unido.org/Regions.cfm?area=GLO. 
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Table 2: Value added per worker in agriculture and manufacturing (at constant prices) 
 1950    1960    1970 
  Ag Min  Ind  Man Services Tot   Ag Min  Ind  Man Services  Tot   Ag Min  Ind  Man Services Tot 
India               77 344  162 120 155  100  67 350  192 140 179  100
Indonesia                                      
M a l a y s i a                                       
P a k i s t a n                                       
P h i l i p p i n e s                                      
South  Korea                            49  153  125  88  167  100
Sri  Lanka                                      
Taiwan                            40  294  119  111  147  100
Thailand               46 238  326 283 287  100  38 134  300 294 274  100
T u r k e y                                       
                                      
Argentina  29 94  113 98  134  100  39 142  91  86  135  100  43 242  115 114 110  100
Bolivia  31 783  334 205 235  100  32 799  298 229 231  100  25 621  268 194 183  100
Brazil  26 111  180 165 220  100  22 173  204 196 179  100  19 269  169 180 170  100
Chile  28 183  125 78  139  100  21 162  147 127 125  100  19 229  151 127 114  100
Colombia  54 262  160 134 160  100  50 277  171 147 140  100  53 385  159 129 118  100
Costa  Rica  46 31  144 149 187  100  36 30  127 141 189  100  41 40  131 157 149  100
Mexico  30 166  139 130 237  100  27 121  131 127 208  100  26 96  115 112 180  100
Peru               26 452  173 137 198  100  23 481  159 142 169  100
Venezuela  11 1649 332 78  80  100  12 1950 313 90  61  100  18 2691 270 105 63  100
                                      22 
 
Average  Asia                            48  233  184  158  192  100
Average Latin 
America  32 410  191 130 174  100  30 456  184 142 163  100  30 562  171 140 139  100
          
 1980    1990    2000 
  Ag Min  Ind  Man Services Tot   Ag Min  Ind  Man Services Tot   Ag Min  Ind  Man Services Tot 
India  57 555  222 158 206  100  50 458  221 175 190  100   41 446  169 142 219  100
Indonesia  42 2909 320 165 110  100  39 1253 243 193 119  100   40 1099 217 196 96  100
Malaysia  61 1013 169 120 97  100  64 1737 149 126 91  100   54 1981 123 115 98  100
P a k i s t a n                                       
Philippines  49 304  274 261 95  100  54 287  248 278 95  100   56 333  243 271 89  100
South  Korea  41 172  131 113 130  100  48 160  132 115 95  100   57 427  181 192 69  100
Sri  Lanka                                      
Taiwan  36  258 98 96  135  100    31  398 92 95  126  100    27  392 88 96  118  100
Thailand  33 167  249 259 206  100  24 479  246 263 187  100   28 1110 220 243 122  100
T u r k e y                                       
                                      
Argentina  46 327  112 115 105  100  67 480  123 127 96  100   76 700  166 161 85  100
Bolivia  32 312  198 181 133  100  40 438  236 229 112  100   49 462  155 170 108  100
Brazil  17 205  173 190 140  100  28 372  154 143 116  100   37 646  182 166 95  100
Chile  25 316  149 130 104  100  39 268  151 125 93  100   63 625  175 145 79  100
Colombia  55 137  169 162 107  100  61 329  165 138 98  100   67 401  165 143 93  100
Costa  Rica  42 52  127 151 123  100  47 111  115 126 126  100   62 72  140 163 95  100
Mexico  26 153  106 104 145  100  32 179  105 107 131  100   37 322  110 120 113  10023 
 
Peru  18 362  180 169 144  100  31 384  167 145 118  100   32 689  224 173 111  100
Venezuela  36 1545 190 131 71  100  43 1393 201 155 71  100   38 1759 213 137 66  100
                                      
Average  Asia 46 768  209 167 140  100  44 682  190 178 129  100   43 827  177 179 116  100
Average Latin 
America  33 379  156 148 119  100  43 439  157 144 107  100   51 631  170 153 94  100
Note: At constant prices. The base-year varies per country, but all base-years are in the mid-1990s. 
Source: GGDC, ten sector database, downloaded February 2009.   24
Table 3: Growth of output and productivity in agriculture and manufacturing, 1950–2005 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from the following sources: Advanced economies plus South Korea, 
1973–2005: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, EUKLEMS database, downloaded July 2008. 
Developing countries, 1950–2005 and. South Korea, 1953–1973: Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, 10-sector database, downloaded 2009. 
Developing countries with data which do not cover the full period 1950–2005 include the following: Bolivia 
(lab 50-03); India (lab, 60-04); Indonesia (lab 61-05; va, 60-05); Korea (lab, 63-05; VA, 53-05); Malaysia 
(lab 75-05 ; VA, 70-05); Peru (Lab, 60-05); Philippines (Lab 63-05; VA 51-05); Taiwan (Lab 63-05; VA 51-
05); Thailand (Lab 60-05; VA 51-05). 
   
Country Agric- Manu- Total Agri- Manu- Total Agri- Manu- Total Agri- Manu- Total
Argentina 2,8 2,6 1,3 1,9 3,6 2,6 3,0 1,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 1,8
Bolivia 1,9 2,1 2,7 1,2 3,3 3,0 2,5 -1,3 -0,4 2,7 2,6 2,4
Brazil 2,1 4,9 4,1 3,8 8,8 7,5 3,9 0,2 0,9 3,4 2,4 3,2
Chile 0,1 4,0 2,0 0,4 6,3 3,6 5,7 2,5 1,5 5,7 2,9 4,1
Colombia 2,3 3,8 1,0 3,4 6,5 3,5 1,3 0,3 0,7 2,6 3,0 3,7
Costa Rica 3,6 3,9 3,5 5,0 8,7 7,0 1,8 1,0 0,5 2,8 4,7 4,1
India 0,4 3,7 1,9 2,3 5,4 3,5 0,9 3,0 2,9 2,7 6,1 5,3
Indonesia 2,1 1,6 3,7 3,1 6,8 5,9 2,3 4,9 2,9 3,1 9,2 5,4
Korea 3,1 7,3 4,6 3,8 15,9 6,1 4,8 8,4 4,9 1,6 11,2 7,3
Malaysia 3,8 3,5 3,8 2,6 9,0 6,7
Mexico 2,8 3,0 3,6 3,6 7,7 6,2 1,7 0,6 0,4 1,8 3,5 3,4
Peru 5,4 19,3 16,6 3,2 7,4 5,9 1,5 0,7 0,1 2,9 1,8 2,3
Philippines 1,0 0,3 0,6 2,5 2,8 3,4
Taiwan 10,9 11,1 12,4 12,2 22,2 17,2 7,6 6,9 8,8 4,3 9,1 11,0
Thailand 3,1 5,6 4,9 4,7 9,4 7,1 2,6 2,9 3,5 3,2 8,1 6,1
Venezuela 5,3 3,5 2,1 5,3 8,9 5,5 1,1 0,7 -1,2 2,1 2,1 1,7
Australia 3,4 2,5 1,6 2,8 1,3 3,2
Austria 3,5 3,6 2,2 1,1 2,4 2,4
Belgium 3,7 4,1 1,7 1,6 2,0 2,1
Czech Republic 7,1 5,0 2,5 1,4 4,7 2,1
Denmark 6,3 1,9 1,5 2,9 0,4 1,8
Finland 4,5 4,8 0,0 0,7 3,9 0,0
France 4,7 3,1 1,7 1,4 1,5 2,2
Germany 4,1 2,4 1,5 0,7 1,0 2,0
Greece 3,4 2,5 1,6 2,8 1,3 3,2
Hungary 10,8 7,7 4,0 1,6 5,5 2,9
Ireland 4,2 6,8 2,9 1,8 7,4 4,8
Italy 5,7 2,4 1,5 1,5 2,0 2,1
Japan 5,7 8,3 6,4 2,4 12,5 8,4 2,6 4,5 2,7 -0,6 3,6 3,1
Netherlands 3,7 3,1 1,2 3,3 2,1 2,5
Poland 1,4 7,2 4,0 1,7 5,0 3,6
Spain 6,0 1,9 1,4 2,5 2,1 2,7
Sweden 3,6 4,4 1,9 0,4 3,0 2,2
UK 2,9 2,9 1,6 1,2 0,3 2,0
USA 5,3 3,7 1,3 4,9 2,8 2,9
Average:
Developing Countries 3,3 5,4 4,6 3,9 8,6 6,1 2,8 2,3 1,9 2,9 5,0 4,5
Advanced Economies 4,6 3,9 1,9 1,8 2,8 2,5
1950-1973 1973-2005
Value added Labour productivity Labour productivity Value added  25
Table 4: Sector capital-intensity in agriculture and manufacturing 
(Sectoral capital-intensity as % of total)
a b 
  1970   1980   1990   2000  
  Agric. Manuf. Agric. Manuf. Agric. Manuf. Agric. Manuf.
India  25 199 24 210 20 206    
Indonesia 3  114  3  65  10  57     
Pakistan  34 93  27 120 22 134    
Philippines  42 138 14 166 9  168    
South  Korea  18 159 25 100 42 87     
Sri  Lanka      7 53 4 31    
Taiwan  32 131 29 85  27 77     
Turkey  26 188 22 173 16 88     
Argentina  59   52   52      
Chile  48 88  67 70  77 37     
Colombia  19 89  15 90  11 70     
Peru  13 133 14 130 16 97     
Venezuela  63 109 40 88  28 87     
Egypt  33 166 25 186 27 181    
Morocco        6      
Average developing 
countries  32 134 26 118 24 102    
Australia  114 50  125 55  112 71  105 81 
Austria      59 69  60 81  62 90 
Czech  Rep.           59  64 
Denmark  141 53  177 65  207 69  235 84 
Finland  44  98  77  81  114 95  151 94 
West  Germany  71 61  83 68  97 74     
Germany           110  85 
Italy  52  85  69  95  107 100  137 108 
Japan  67 114 72 97  93 93  118  105 
Netherlands  106 67  125 69  135 80  146 90 
Portugal           33  95 
Sweden           119  106 
UK  207 76  226 84  205 95  178 98 
USA  151 81  173 89  145 96  114 104 
             
Average advanced 
economies  106 76  119 77  127 85  121 93 
     26
Notes: 
a capital-intensity total calculated excluding real estate for advanced economies. Real 
estate refers to the residential capital stock. We assume the totals for developing countries from 
Larson et al. 2000 also exclude real estate;
 b agricultural capital stock in developing countries 
refers to gross fixed capital stock excluding tree stock and cattle stock. In the advanced 
economy data, agricultural capital stock includes tree stock and cattle stock. This results in an 
upward bias in the estimates of agricultural capital-intensity.  
Source: own calculations from the following sources, capital stock developing countries, Larson 
et al. (2000); persons engaged developing countries, GGDC 10 sector database, except Egypt, 
Morocco, Pakistan from ILO, Labour Statistics Database (2008). 
Advanced economies: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, available at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/index-dseries.html, EUKLEMS database (downloaded September 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 